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How Should Commercial Real Estate Be Priced?
Abstract
When it comes to real estate pricing, most investors revert to the cap rate because it's simple, and it's the
norm of the industry. But a correlation analysis indicates that cap rates have been largely unresponsive to
alternative rates of return available to investors, with the exception of BBB bonds, over most of the past
25 years. Other pricing tools such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model; a comparative analysis with assets
of similar credit risk; and the Gordon Dividend Growth Model provide much more elegant, yet still simple,
alternatives to evaluating real estate pricing.
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Commercial real estate pricing

C O M M E R C I A L

analysis of the data.
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pricing is like the weather: everyone talks
about it, but few understand it. Most
observers base “appropriate” real estate
pricing on historical norms. The cap
rate—an indicator of value relative to stabilized net operating income (NOI)
before capital expenditures, tenant
improvement, and leasing commissions—
is the most commonly used metric of real
estate pricing. But cap rates have been
largely unresponsive to alternative rates of
return available to investors, with the
exception of BBB bonds, throughout
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Table I: Cap rate correlations
Cap Rate Correlation With:*
BBB Corp

Multifamily

10-Year
Treasury

Bond Yield
(10-15 yr)

S&P Dividend
Yield

0.187

0.771

0.068

Industrial

-0.221

0.748

-0.307

CBD Office

-0.449

0.694

-0.458

Retail

-0.181

0.649

-02.58

* Based on 25 years of data for the 10-yr T & S&P Div Yld; and 14 years for BBB.

Figure 1: NCREIF cap rates vs. 10-year Treasury
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most of the past twenty-five years (Table
I). Such a relationship defies investment
theory, as real estate pricing should change
as property risks and the returns of alternative investments change.
Figure 1 displays NCREIF cap rates by
property type compared to the ten-year
Treasury yield. Because the National
Council of Real Estate Investment
Fiduciaries (NCREIF) cap rate data is
seriously flawed due to appraisal lags, it is

1998
10-yr reasury

2002

2006

CBD Office

presented in Figure 2 with an eighteenmonth lag. This data provides an overview
of the pricing of institutional quality real
estate. Figure 2 reflects these cap rates net
of the ten-year Treasury yield. Since cap
rate spreads are highly correlated across
property types (Table II), we can speak of
“cap rates” without reference to property
type with little loss of insight. Cap rate
spreads were negative in the early to mid1980s, when purchasing real estate was
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Figure 2: Cap rate spreads over 10-year Treasury
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Table II: Correlations of spreads by property type
Correlation of Cap Rate Spreads Over Treasury
Multifamily

Industrial
CBD Office

0.924

Retail

0.922

more about investing in tax losses than
real estate cash streams. When tax laws
dramatically changed in 1986, cap rate
spreads rose, though they generally
remained negative due to the availability
of excess leverage through 1990 and projections of strong cash flow growth, in
spite of weak fundamentals.
Throughout the first two-thirds of the
1990s, spreads substantially widened as
capital abandoned real estate. Spreads further widened in the latter part of the
1990s, as investors scorned cash flow during the tech bubble and treasury rates
drifted downward. As the tech bubble

86

ZELL/LURIE

Industrial

CBD Office

0.937

REAL

ESTATE

CENTER

0.969

0.964

burst, cap rates spreads steadily compressed, recently falling to approximately
zero. And if NOI cap rate spreads are
roughly zero, cash flow cap rate spreads
(after reserves for tenant improvements,
leasing commissions, and capital expenditures) are well below zero.
This compression of cap rates and cap
rate spreads over the past five years has
generated enormous wealth for real estate
owners. In fact, the combination of cheap
debt and cap rate compression covered a
multitude of property underwriting
errors made during the past five years, as
neither cap rate compression nor narrow-

ing debt spreads were part of original pro
forma models. This cap rate spread compression offset weak cash flows in a postrecessionary economy from 2002 to
2005, while continued compression,
combined with improved cash flows,
pushed property values skyward in 2006
through mid-2007.
Cap rate compression reduced the
importance of the ability to add value.
After all, if all you had to do to make
money was to leverage to the hilt while cap
rates fell, why take on the extra work and
risk of attempting to add value? Stated differently: Why print money if it is laying
everywhere on the streets?
In Tables III and IV, we demonstrate
the power of cap rate compression via very
simple pro forma cash flow analyses that
assume Year 1 NOI of $100; a going-in
cap rate of 9 percent; an LTV of 70 percent; and an interest rate of 7 percent.
Within each figure, we display two scenarios, which vary based on NOI growth
assumptions. Scenario I assumes that NOI
grows by 3 percent per year, while Scenario
II assumes a value-add NOI growth of 20
percent between years two and three.
The only other difference between
Tables III and IV is in residual cap rates,
which are assumed to be 6 percent and
9 percent, respectively. Based on these
assumptions, we calculate the equity
IRRs. It is clear that cap rate compression is a significant factor in driving

returns. That is, cap rate compression
from 9 percent to 6 percent increased
IRR on leveraged stabilized properties
by 250 percent, to a staggering 57 percent. Who needs to take on value add
risk at this return for stabilized assets?
In the early 1980s, money was made in
real estate by mastering the creation and
syndication of tax gimmicks. In the late
1980s, one made money by mastering
bank and S&L connections to over-leverage. In the early 1990s, one made money in
real estate by having access to equity—the
more the better. During the late 1990s, one
made money from real estate by realizing
large spreads between cap rates and debt
costs. And, over the past five years, the way
to make money in real estate was to own
real estate on a highly leveraged basis as cap
rates plunged.
The classic asset pricing model is the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
CAPM is a simple, yet elegant, model
that relates asset pricing to the risk-free
rate (F), the ability of an asset to reduce
portfolio variance (B), and the expected
rate of return on the market bundle of
investable assets (M). CAPM is far from
perfect, but provides a crude benchmark
for asset pricing, around which discrepancies and novelties arise. Specifically,
CAPM states that an asset’s price is set
such that the expected return for an asset
(R) is
R = F + β(M - F ).
REVIEW
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Table III: Pro forma cash flow, 10 percent residual cap rate
Scenario I with 9% Residual Cap Rate
NOI Growth Rate

3%

Going-in Cap Rate

9%

Implied Purchase Price (Direct CapYr 1 NOI)

$1,111

Loan-to-Value

70%

Equity Financing

$333

Debt Financing

$778

Interest Rate

7%

Residual Cap Rate

9%
Year 0

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4
$109

NOI

$100

$103

$106

Ann Int (Interest Only)

($54)

($54)

($54)

Debt Repayment

($778)

Residual Value (Cap next year's NOI)

$1,214

Net Cash Flow

($333)

Scenario I Equity IRR

$46

$49

$488

23%
Scenario II with 9% Residual Cap Rate

Going-in Cap Rate

9%

Implied Purchase Price (Direct CapYr 1 NOI)

$1,111

Loan-to-Value

70%

Equity Financing

$333

Debt Financing

$778

Interest Rate

7%

Residual Cap Rate

9%
Year 0

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4
$120

NOI

$100

$100

$120

Ann Int (Interest Only)

($54)

($54)

($54)

Debt Repayment

($778)

Residual Value (Cap next year's NOI)

$1,333

Net Cash Flow

($333)

Scenario II Equity IRR
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$46

$46

$621

Table IV: Pro forma cash flow, 6 percent residual cap rate
Scenario I with 6% Residual Cap Rate
NOI Growth Rate

3%

Going-in Cap Rate

9%

Implied Purchase Price (Direct CapYr 1 NOI)

$1,111

Loan-to-Value

70%

Equity Financing

$333

Debt Financing

$778

Interest Rate

7%

Residual Cap Rate

6%
Year 0

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

NOI

$100

$103

$106

$109

Ann Int (Interest Only)

($54)

($54)

($54)

Debt Repayment

($778)

Residual Value (Cap next year's NOI)

$1,821

Net Cash Flow
Scenario I Equity IRR

($333)

$46

$49

$1,095

57%
Scenario II with 6% Residual Cap Rate

Going-in Cap Rate

9%

Implied Purchase Price (Direct CapYr 1 NOI)

$1,111

Loan-to-Value

70%

Equity Financing

$333

Debt Financing

$778

Interest Rate

7%

Residual Cap Rate

6%
Year 0

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4
$120

NOI

$100

$100

$120

Ann Int (Interest Only)

($54)

($54)

($54)

Debt Repayment

($778)

Residual Value (Cap next year's NOI)

$2,000

Net Cash Flow
Scenario II Equity IRR

($333)

$46

$46

$1,288

65%
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If beta equals one, it means that the
asset’s return moves in coincidence with
the market return, providing no ability
to reduce portfolio expected return
volatility. As a result, the expected return
for such an asset should gravitate toward
the return on the market portfolio.
If beta is greater than one, the asset’s
return increases more than the market
return, and falls more than the market
return. Such an asset accentuates the
return volatility of a portfolio, as it rises or
falls more than the market. In order to
accept this increased portfolio volatility,
the expected return must exceed the
expected return for the market portfolio.
Similarly, if beta is less than one, the
expected return for the asset should be less
than the market rate of return, as the asset
is able to reduce portfolio risk. In fact, an
asset that is uncorrelated with the market
(β = 0) should price such that it need only
generate the risk-free rate of return.
Applying CAPM to real estate provides dramatic insights about the history
of real estate pricing, as it says that real
estate returns should reflect real estate’s
beta, the expected market return, and the
risk-free rate. Since real estate generates
its return through a combination of current cash flow and expected appreciation,
we need to measure both at various
points in time in order to evaluate actual
real estate pricing versus expected pricing
indicated by CAPM.
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As the proxy of real estate’s current
cash flow return, we use the dividend
yield on REITs, and proxy the expected
perpetuity real estate appreciation rate by
the three-year moving average of the core
inflation rate (excluding food and energy). This highly simplified model suggests that at any moment in time the
expected return for holding real estate
equals the current REIT dividend rate
(which is near 100 percent of cash flow
post-reserves) plus the three-year moving
average rate of inflation (that is, the longterm cash flow growth equals inflation).
At each point in history, we compare the
actual dividend yield (grossed up for six
months of growth) to the dividend yield
implied by CAPM, assuming a beta of
0.5. This tells us how much real estate
prices would have had to have risen (or
fallen) for this implied real estate return
to be equal to the return indicated by
CAPM. For example, at year-end 2006,
the actual dividend yield (grossed up for
six months of growth) was 3.74 percent,
while CAPM implied real estate deserved
a 4.16 percent dividend yield. This was
an indication that the price of real estate
was 10 percent too high, as the current
return expectation fell short of expectations implied by CAPM.
The blue line in Figure 3 plots the
extent of real estate overpricing exercise
based on the weighted average dividend
yield of all publicly traded equity REITs

Figure 3: Real estate (under) pricing through March 28, 2008

BETA

Long Term Annual Dividend Growth
0.3

2.0%
-66.8%

2.5%
-100.7%

3.0%
-152.0%

3.5%
-238.3%

0.4

-43.7%

-68.2%

-102.7%

-155.0%

0.5

-26.2%

-44.7%

-69.5%

-104.7%

0.6

-12.5%

-27.0%

-45.7%

-70.9%

from 1993 through the first quarter of
2008. Since beta equals 0.5 (in line with
historic norms) in this analysis, real
estate returns are correlated with market
returns, but only half as volatile. As a
result, real estate return expectations
should be less than the return expectations for the market portfolio. In a simple example, if the risk-free rate is 5 percent, beta is 0.5, and the expected market
rate of return is 9 percent, the expected
return for real estate lies midway between
the risk-free rate and the market rate, at
7 percent. For real estate to generate a 7
percent return expectation in a world of
2.5 percent inflation (hence expected
appreciation), real estate cash flow cap
rates need to be 4.5 percent. If real estate
requires a 25 percent reserve for capital
expenditures, leasing commissions, and
tenant improvements, it must price at a 6
percent cap rate on stabilized NOI in
order to generate a 4.5 percent cash flow
return. That is, the implied required cash
flow cap rate must be grossed up by the
extent of capital reserves to obtain the
expected NOI cap rate.

Reviewing the blue line in Figure 3
reveals that in the early 1990s, when capital abandoned real estate during the real
estate depression, real estate was massively
under-priced. This is consistent with the
fact that most knowledgeable real estate
players desired to buy real estate during
this period, but lacked an essential ingredient: equity. As capital returned to real
estate in the form of real estate private
equity funds, REITs, and securitized debt,
the extent of real estate under-pricing fell.
Thus, by early 1998, it was “only” about
20 percent under-priced. But as the tech
bubble drove real estate cap rates upward
even as treasury yields fell, real estate
under-pricing on the order of 60 percent
to 80 percent resulted. This under-pricing
of real estate was consistent with the
under-pricing of most cash flow businesses
during the tech bubble, when strong cash
flow was shunned in favor of “clicks.”
Recall that this was a time when Warren
Buffett supposedly had lost his touch
because he refused to invest in dot-coms,
preferring out-of-favor cash flow investments. As the tech bubble burst in 2001,
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and cap rate spreads compressed, the
under-pricing slowly but steadily evaporated. By mid-2006, pricing had come
roughly in line with CAPM expectations
for a beta of 0.5.
Subsequent to the euphoria associated with the EOP and Archstone goingprivate transactions, real estate pricing
swung to 15 percent to 20 percent overpriced based upon CAPM. As interest
rates rose, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
tightened, and CMBS spreads widened
from April 2007 through August, REIT
pricing reacted, with prices falling in line
with those predicted by CAPM. In fact,
as of mid-October, CAPM analysis indicates that REIT pricing was about right.
However, as the depth of the credit crisis
unfolded, real estate became increasingly
out of favor. As of the end of March
2008, CAPM indicates that REITs are
36 percent under-valued.
An alternative approach to pricing
real estate is what we call the “it tastes
like chicken” (ITLC) approach. Though
less elegant than CAPM, this approach
states that real estate should price comparable to comparable risk claims. For
example, quality apartments should generate the same general return as other
high-quality consumer receivables, as
apartment ownership is a high-quality
consumer receivable, and renters will
generally pay rent before they pay their
credit card and car debt. Since credit
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cards and car loans are widely sold on the
capital markets, by comparing real estate
returns to these consumer receivables,
ITLC provides a crude approximation of
expected apartment pricing.
Similarly, office properties in world
class CBDs are dominated by a diverse
set of corporate tenants (including
banks, insurance companies, corporations, law firms, etc.). ITLC implies that
these properties should generate a return
roughly commensurate with the longterm debt claims on these tenants. This is
because stabilized office properties in
these markets are perpetuity lease claims
on this tenant base, and tenants will
honor these lease claims about the same
as their debt claims. The debt claims on
corporate tenants, which are widely sold
in the capital markets, provide an
approximation of the return one deserves
for such office properties.
The credit quality of the office tenants affects the expected real estate
return, just as debtor quality affects the
expected pricing of their debt. For example, ITLC suggests that for quality office
properties located near the White House,
which will always be occupied by the
U.S. government and high-quality tenants who need to be near the government, real estate returns should be
roughly comparable to AAA to AA debt.
For midtown Manhattan office buildings, with their diverse portfolio of high-

grade corporate tenants, pricing should
be roughly commensurate with highgrade corporate debt (A- to BBB+). For
lesser tenant quality properties and markets, the pricing should be higher reflective of the lower credit quality of tenants
(BBB to B+).
An adjustment should be made reflective of the differential liquidity of real
estate versus debt claims. Although not as
liquid as debt claims (i.e., bonds), as real
estate investments have become more liquid via REITs, deeper markets, greater
transparency, and more diversified
investor holdings, real estate pricing
should have improved.
Some object to ITLC, noting that
unlike a portfolio of bonds, real estate
ownership provides a real asset (the property) at the end of the lease. But at the
end of the lease, this ownership simply
means that the owner refills the property
with new tenants, effectively repeating
this exercise into perpetuity. If the
prospective tenant pool is dominated by
tenants of roughly comparable credit as
that of existing tenants, the ownership of
the property is effectively a perpetuity
lease claim of comparable risk to the perpetuity debt claims on tenants.
If the property is of insufficient quality
to merit leasing to comparable tenant
quality upon lease expiration, stabilization
pricing analysis is inappropriate. For example, if the market is comprised of low-qual-

ity tenants, while the current tenant is a
high-quality credit who is only on the lease
for a few years, the pricing of the property
must reflect a blended credit quality. Thus,
the ITLC approach to real estate pricing is
most easily applied to buildings with tenants who are representative of the market’s
tenant pool.
The beauty of ITLC is that it allows the
use of the tenant, building, and market
quality to assess the relevant credit against
which expected real estate returns are evaluated. This expected total return is composed of the current cash flow and expected appreciation.
If the debt claims of the tenants dominating the typical commercial market are
BBB, and BBB debt yields 7 percent, and
the expected real estate cash flow appreciation rate is approximately the 2.5 percent economy-wide inflation rate, then
the expected cash flow cap rate for the
properties in that market is approximately 4.5 percent. That is, a 4.5 percent current cash flow plus a 2.5 percent expected
appreciation return, yields a 7 percent
total expected return for real estate,
roughly equal to the 7 percent yield on
the BBB debt. If reserves for TIs, capital
expenditures, and leasing commissions
are approximately 25 percent of NOI, a 6
percent NOI cap rate is appropriate for a
BBB tenant pool property, as a 6 percent
NOI cap rate yields a 4.5 percent cash
flow cap rate.
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The red line in Figure 3 applies ITLC
to real estate pricing, where BBB debt is
used as the relevant tenant pool. The
extent of overpricing is derived in the same
manner as was described for CAPM.
ITLC reveals the same basic pricing history, though the extent of under-pricing during the tech bubble is somewhat less than
indicated by CAPM, with substantial
under-pricing lasting somewhat longer
into the 2000s based upon ITLC.
The Gordon model for valuing a perpetuity cash flow yields a simple, yet powerful, solution for expected cash flow cap
rates. This model states that the cap rate is
the difference between the property’s discount rate and perpetuity cash flow
growth rate. So if the discount rate reflective of the risk of the property is approximately 8 percent, and the perpetuity
growth rate of its cash streams is approximately 2.5 percent (general inflation),
then the cash flow cap rate should be
approximately 5.5 percent. If reserves are
25 percent of cash flows, the theoretically
expected NOI cap rate is 7.3 percent.
The Gordon model, like CAPM and
ITLC, highlights the fact that the cap rate
should vary with returns on alternative
investments, as the discount rate reflects
the risk-free rate plus the risk premium
associated with real estate, plus the illiquidity premium. The risk-free rate is proxied by ten-year Treasury, while the additional premium for alternative assets is
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reflected by risk spreads that the capital
market assigns to alternative investments
with similar risk characteristics. The riskfree rate rises and falls with inflation, while
the risk spread required on alternative
assets will vary as investor risk perceptions
change. Liquidity premiums vary as capital
markets evolve and deepen.
These alternative approaches underscore that real estate returns should vary as
alternative investments opportunities
change over time, as well as inflation,
growth, risk, and liquidity change.
Armed with these general models of
pricing, we demonstrate how different
types of office properties should price
using ITLC, based upon the risk-free rate,
the nature of the tenant pool, building
quality, the operated cash flow growth
rates, reserve gap between NOI and cash
flow, and illiquidity.
Table V summarizes our analysis for
office buildings in four distinct quality
markets. In each case, we focus on a property that is of typical quality for that market category, with typical reserves and typical long-term expected growth rate for each
market. The markets differ in terms of the
reserve gap between NOI and cash flow,
due to the variable expenses associated with
tenant releasing costs. We utilize proprietary data on the history of properties in a
variety of markets to estimate these gaps.
Markets also vary in terms of their longterm cash flow growth rates, and liquidity.

Table V: Real estate pricing expectation model
Real Estate Pricing Expectation Model

Strong

Good

Typical

Weak

10-YearTreasury

4.70%

4.70%

4.70%

4.70%

Tenant credit premium

1.75%

2.00%

2.00%

2.25%

Liquidity premium

0.25%

0.50%

0.50%

1.00%

Expected total return (IRR)

6.70%

7.20%

7.20%

7.95%

Less expected appreciation

-3.00%

-2.75%

-2.50%

-2.50%

Expected cash flow cap rate

3.70%

4.45%

4.70%

5.45%

Cash flow as percent of NOI

81%

76%

70%

62%

Implied NOI cap rate

4.57%

5.86%

6.71%

8.79%

Capital adjustment for 10-year hold*

0.12%

0.29%

0.52%

0.88%

* This is to suggest that after 10 years, one should apply a higher residual cap rate because the next buyer will incur greater
capital costs on the then-older building.

The strongest markets, which include
midtown New York, Washington, D.C.,
and the San Francisco CBD, have
approximately a 19 percent gap between
NOI and cash flow. At the other
extreme, poor markets have a 38 percent
reserve gap. This is reflective of greater
tenant improvement costs, leasing commissions and capital expenditures relative to market rents in poor markets.
Adjustments are also made to reflect that
cash flow will decline as a property’s
capital expenditures rises over time,
resulting in a higher NOI cap rate upon
exit. That is, a building that is new today
will not trade at the cap rate of a new
building ten years from now, but rather
the NOI cap rate for a ten-year-old
building, which is slightly higher since
the ten-year-old building has less cash

flow for a given NOI due to higher capital expenditure requirements.
We begin this pricing analysis with the
risk-free rate, which is 4.7 percent (reflective of the ten-year Treasury rate at the
time of writing). We add to this return a
risk premium reflective of the pool of local
tenants. Since BBB credit historically
trades at roughly 200 basis points over
treasury, the risk premium for most markets is 200 basis points. The third line in
Table V reflects the fact that liquidity is
greater in stronger/deeper markets. This
premium ranges from 25 to 100 basis
points across markets.
Adding these three components generates the total expected return that investors
should require for stabilized properties in
these markets, which range from 6.7 percent to 7.95 percent. Note that these
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expected returns will change as treasury
rates, tenant credit premiums, and liquidity change. The expected appreciation for
most markets is 2.5 percent (the expected
rate of inflation). However, supply constrained markets will have somewhat higher growth rates since supply will generally
lag demand. Thus, if a 6.7 percent total
return is required in a strong market, and
3 percent derives from appreciation, the
expected cash flow cap rate is 3.7 percent.
For weak markets, a cash flow cap rate of
5.45 percent is required to achieve the
expected 7.95 percent return.
Adjusting these cash flow cap rates
upward to get to the NOI cap rate implied
by typical market TIs, leasing commissions
and capital expenditures, generates the
implied NOI cap rate. In the case of strong
markets, this is approximately 4.57 percent, while in the case of weak markets it is
8.79 percent. Note that because of the
greater deduction associated with reserves
in weak markets relative to strong markets,
the gap between NOI cap rates notably
exceeds that of cash flow cap rates. That is,
high NOI cap rates do not necessarily generate higher cash flow returns.
The next line indicates that as the
property ages ten years, the NOI cap rate
should rise, reflective of the fact that there
is higher capital expenditure required for
older buildings. Based on proprietary
information, we estimate that this component amounts to 12 to 88 basis points,
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depending upon market category. Not surprisingly, this adjustment is greatest in
weak markets, as relative fixed capital
expenditures amount to a greater proportion of low rents. Hence, if one enters at a
strong market 4.5 percent cap rate, the
expectation is that they will leave at
approximately a 4.67 percent cap rate a
decade later. For a property in a weak market, the ten-year change is from 8.79 percent to 9.67 percent. Conducting similar
analysis of earlier times is consistent with
the patterns indicated by CAPM and
ITLC. Specifically, we have gone from a
period of massive under-pricing of the real
estate to a period of modest overpricing of
real estate.
A disciplined and consistent
approach to pricing real estate exists,
which prices on the basis of market alternatives, property and tenant profiles, liquidity, and cash flow growth expectations. This analysis provides a beginning
step to a more systematic and disciplined
analysis of real estate pricing than has
historically been the case.

